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IMMIGRATION AND ALIENS-CATCH 22:
ALIENS FACE No WIN SITUATION AFTER
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO TOLL
THE VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE PERIOD
FOR TIMELY FILED MOTIONS TO REOPEN
John Brozovich*
LTHOUGH the current immigration debate is ongoing, Con-
gress showed decisiveness toward illegal aliens when it passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act ("IIRIRA") in 1996. Under the IIRIRA, illegal aliens deemed re-
movable may depart from the country voluntarily and at their own ex-
pense if an immigration judge enters an order granting their voluntary
departure.' Each illegal alien may file one motion to reopen, which cre-
ates an opportunity to disprove his or her removability, within ninety
days of the entry of a final order of removal.2 Ideally, an alien would
agree to voluntarily depart, then file a motion to reopen with the Board
of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and the BIA would hear and rule on
that motion within the voluntarily departure period. The BIA, however,
seldom hears a motion to reopen before the voluntary departure period
expires.3 When the BIA does not hear the motion to reopen within the
voluntary departure period, the alien has a Hobson's choice between ei-
ther (a) staying in the country, overstaying the departure period, and thus
having the motion denied for violating the voluntary departure order or
(b) leaving the country and thereby automatically withdrawing the mo-
tion to reopen.4 As a result of this dichotomy, a growing split has
emerged in the federal circuits as to whether courts should tell the volun-
tary departure period for an alien's timely filed motion to reopen.5 The
U.S. Fifth Circuit's decision in Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, which went con-
* J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(a), (b) (West 2006).
2. Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i).
3. See, e.g., Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 2006).
4. Banda-Oritz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2006) (Smith, J. dissenting).
5. Compare Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391, and Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507 (refusing
to toll the voluntary departure period), with Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d
1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2006), Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005),
Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005), and Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407
F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (permitting the tolling of the voluntary departure period).
SMU LAW REVIEW
trary to an established line of cases, was the first opinion to hold that an
alien's voluntary departure period should not be tolled for a pending mo-
tion to reopen. 6 The decision was in error because, while it gave great
weight to the concept of voluntary departure, it altogether ignored the
alien's statutory right to file and obtain judgment on a motion to reopen.
Sergio Banda-Ortiz, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States in
1989.7 In March of 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") served Banda-Ortiz with a Notice to Appear, which charged him
with removability from the United States because he had never been pa-
roled or admitted into the country.8 At the time he was charged, Banda-
Ortiz was employed, had never been convicted of a crime, and had two
children born as U.S. citizens. 9 Although Banda-Ortiz conceded remova-
bility, he requested cancellation of removal from the immigration judge.10
Banda-Ortiz claimed the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
exception provided under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) on account of the
difficulties his departure would impose on his American-born children; in
the alternative, he requested voluntary departure." The immigration
judge denied Banda-Ortiz's claim for the hardship exception but granted
his request for voluntary departure. 12 Banda-Ortiz appealed the decision
to the BIA, which affirmed the lower court's decision and gave him a
thirty day voluntary departure period. 13
While he was still technically within the voluntary departure period,
Banda-Ortiz filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings in order to
introduce new evidence of the applicability of the hardship exception to
his case. 14 The BIA initially granted Banda-Ortiz's motion to reopen and
remanded the case to the immigration judge for consideration of the new
evidence.' 5 On remand, however, the immigration judge held that Banda-
Ortiz was ineligible for any cancellation of removal because he had failed
to depart the United States within the voluntary departure period; the
BIA affirmed that decision. 16
Banda-Ortiz appealed the order denying the cancellation of his re-
moval to the Fifth Circuit. Banda-Ortiz argued that the voluntary depar-
ture period should have been tolled because, as other circuits had held, it
would be "nonsensical" to allow an alien one motion to reopen which, if
still pending at the end of the voluntary departure period, would never be
6. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391 (Smith, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 388.
8. Id.; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 2006).
9. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 388.
11. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)).
12. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(b)(1)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 388 n.2 (noting that Banda-Ortiz filed his motion to reopen two days after
the voluntary departure period expired and then obtained a two-day nunc pro tunc exten-
sion from the INS, which made that motion timely).
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)).
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heard if the alien (a) complied with voluntary departure and left the
United States, or (b) violated the departure period by staying in the coun-
try beyond the departure date.17 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Banda-
Ortiz's arguments and held that his timely filed motion to reopen did not
toll the voluntary departure period. 18
The Fifth Circuit's refusal to toll the voluntary departure period for an
alien awaiting judgment on a motion to reopen disregarded the alien's
right to one motion to reopen. The court's rationale instead focused on
two arguments in support of strictly adhering to the voluntarily departure
statute. First, the court emphasized that voluntary departure is a mutual
agreement between the alien and the government that is structured in
such a way that both parties benefit, and as such, each party must uphold
its end of the agreement. 19 Second, the court interpreted statutes that
preclude any extensions of the voluntary departure period to prohibit the
tolling of that period as well.20
The Fifth Circuit first emphasized that voluntary departure is a two-
step process: the alien must first request voluntary departure, and then
agree to its terms. 21 As a part of the agreement, the alien must prove that
he intends to leave the country within the departure period.22 The court
claimed that Banda-Ortiz did not have the requisite intent to depart from
the United States because he did not leave the country within the depar-
ture period. The court, therefore, found that Banda-Ortiz's request for
tolling was an attempt to benefit unjustly from the voluntary departure
agreement.23 Voluntary departure benefits an alien because it enables the
alien to (1) "choose his own destination," (2) arrange his personal affairs
without fear of arrest, (3) be free from detention before removal, (4)
avoid the "stigma of forced removal," and (5) remain eligible for an ad-
justment of status.24 In exchange for these benefits, the alien accepts the
burdens of fines and the possibility of being ineligible for further relief if
he does not leave within the specified period. 25 While voluntary depar-
ture gives the alien incentives to depart voluntarily, the government also
benefits because voluntary departure allows agencies and courts to
devote fewer resources to the deportation of aliens.26 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that if a timely filed motion to reopen tolled period, the volun-
tary departure, the government would lose the financial benefits of the
alien's self-managed and expedient departure while the alien would still
retain his benefits by voluntarily departing the country at a later date.27
17. Id. at 389 (citing Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2005)).
18. Id. at 391 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)).
19. Id. at 389-90.
20. Id. at 390 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(b)(2)).
21. Id. at 389 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c) (2006)).
22. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(b)(1)(D)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 389-90 (citing Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004)).
25. Id. at 390 (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)).
26. Id. (citing Alimi v. Ashcroft, 391 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2004)).
27. Id. at 390 (citing Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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While the dissent in Banda-Ortiz agreed that voluntary departure con-
stitutes an agreement between the alien and the government, it recog-
nized that the larger statutory framework also grants the alien the right to
one motion to reopen.2 8 The majority's rationale, which only upholds a
motion to reopen insofar as it is heard within the departure period, forces
aliens to forfeit a motion to reopen not heard within the voluntary depar-
ture period. The majority overlooked that when Congress granted aliens
the right to a motion to reopen, it limited that right by only granting one
motion, by requiring a factual basis for the motion, and by requiring the
alien to file the motion within ninety days of the removal order.2 9 Con-
gress made no indication that it wanted to exclude voluntarily departing
illegal aliens from those who can file a motion to reopen.30
The second prong of the Fifth Circuit's analysis focused on strict con-
struction of the voluntary departure statutes. The court referred to 8
C.F.R. § 1240.26(f), which limits the authority to extend voluntary depar-
ture to "the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commis-
sioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of
Juvenile Affairs. ' 31 The court noted that in several cases, appeals courts
have held they lacked jurisdiction over the BIA's voluntary departure
order to toll the voluntary departure period.32 The court also reasoned
that tolling of the voluntary departure period is not permitted under 8
U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 because both-which do not
address tolling-state that the period should not exceed sixty days."'3 3
The dissent in Banda-Ortiz argued that other courts have tolled the
voluntary departure period and that such tolling is not barred by stat-
ute.34 The cases cited by the majority to further its argument for lack of
jurisdiction, with the exception of Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, derived from cir-
cuits that have subsequently found jurisdiction and allow the tolling of
the voluntary departure period.35 The lack of jurisdiction claim made by
the Fourth Circuit in Ngarurih is inapplicable to a case such as Banda-
Ortiz's because the "'most fundamental"' support for the Ngarurih
court's lack of jurisdiction was that it could still hear the merits of the
petition for review after the alien left the country.36 Banda-Ortiz's mo-
tion to reopen, by contrast, would be withdrawn immediately if he left the
country. The majority's rigid interpretation of the voluntary departure
28. Id. at 392 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c) (2006) and Azarte v.
Ashcroft, 394F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005)).
29. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283-84 and 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1229a(c)).
30. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress did not state the right to file a
motion to reopen "depends on... the order of removal").
31. Id. at 390 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 391 (Smith, J., dissenting)
35. Id. at 394 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that the Third and Ninth Circuits now
allow for tolling of the voluntary departure period so that courts may consider an alien's
motion to reopen).
36. Id. at 394 (citing Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2004)).
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statutes was also flawed. First, by refusing to toll the voluntary departure
period, the majority prohibited not only consideration of a motion to reo-
pen but also precluded review of all decisions after the voluntary depar-
ture period has expired.37 Second, the majority failed to consider the
statutes that grant aliens the right to a motion to reopen, and those stat-
utes make no exclusions for aliens that have agreed to depart volunta-
rily.38 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that tolling goes against the
voluntary departure statute is misplaced: tolling suspends the period of
time provided in a statute, but it does not extend time against the mean-
ing of the statute.39 For Banda-Ortiz, this tolling would have preserved
his right to one motion to reopen and would have prevented the auto-
matic denial of his hardship claims.
The Fifth Circuit erroneously refused to toll the voluntary departure
statute while Banda-Ortiz's motion to reopen was pending. In so holding,
the Fifth Circuit split from the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which
had developed a line of cases that permitted the tolling of the voluntary
departure period for an alien's timely filed motion to reopen.40 The fed-
eral courts generally should be wary of creating such a circuit split, partic-
ularly when it varies the rights of an alien from one circuit to the next.4'
The key facts of Banda-Ortiz's case, moreover, are consistent with the
voluntary departure cases in other circuits where one problem has been
constant: the "BIA rarely if ever rules on a motion to reopen before an
alien's voluntary departure period has expired. ' 42 The Fifth Circuit over-
looked this problem and as a result, will prevent countless aliens from
their one opportunity to remain in the United States.
To better comprehend the conflict between the voluntary departure
and motion to reopen statutes, courts outside of the Fifth Circuit have
looked to the history behind both statutes. The voluntary departure stat-
ute set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229c greatly specifically the amount of time
granted for voluntarily departure, which previously had been granted up
to a year at a time.43 The goals of voluntary departure, however, re-
mained constant: the government could reduce its costs associated with
deporting individuals while allowing the alien to avoid the "stigma" asso-
ciated with formal deportation. 44 Similarly, the motion to reopen was
originally a regulatory form of relief, without any time limitation, that
was later made into a carefully restricted statutory right.45 And the mo-
37. Id. at 395 (Smith, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7) (West 2006)).
39. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting); see also BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "toll" as "to stop" or "to abate").
40. See Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales,
407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005)
(tolling an alien's voluntary departure period while a motion to reopen is pending).
41. See, e.g., Alfaro v. Comm'r, 349 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2003).
42. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282.
43. Id. at 1284-85.
44. Id. at 1284-85 n.12.
45. Id. at 1283.
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tion to reopen still allows an alien to produce new, relevant information
to the courts regarding his removability. 46 While it is evident that the
goals of these statutes have remained constant, it is the recent changes to
specific provisions that require the courts presently to interpret their new
significance and implications.47
In order to interpret the new voluntary departure and motion to reo-
pen statutes, the majority of circuits have chosen to harmonize the two
statutory schemes and not isolate them as the Fifth Circuit did in Banda-
Ortiz. A court interpreting a statute should "'not look merely to a partic-
ular clause in which general words may be used, but [should] take in con-
nection with it the whole statute."' 48 This analytical framework
encourages courts to recognize the voluntary departure period while ac-
commodating the alien's one motion to reopen as well. While a broader
reading of the statutes is consistent with this construction, this rationale is
also supported by key policy arguments. First, statutes must be inter-
preted to avoid absurd results, and, as several courts have observed, it is
at the very minimum somewhat "absurd to conclude that Congress 'in-
tended to allow motions to reopen to be filed but not heard." 49 Second,
given the serious nature of the voluntary departure agreement and the
severe consequences for an alien's non-compliance with it, construction
of these statutes "should be resolved in favor of the alien."' 50 The tolling
of the voluntary departure statute successfully resolves the conflict be-
tween voluntary departure and motions to reopen by creating an oppor-
tunity for the BIA to hear the alien's motion to reopen while still
upholding the relevant statutes and the policies behind them.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Banda-Ortiz complicated the nationwide
landscape as to whether aliens who have agreed to voluntary departure
will or will not have the departure period tolled by timely filing motions
to reopen.51 This recent split in the circuits contravenes the importance of
"'uniformity of federal law and consistency in the enforcement of the im-
migration laws."' 52 For Banda-Ortiz and countless aliens in his position,
the lapse of the voluntary departure period while a motion to reopen is
46. See, e.g., Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2006).
47. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1287.
48. Id. at 1288 (quoting Kokszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)).
49. Id. at 1282 (quoting Shaar v. I.N.S., 141 F.3d 953,960 (9th Cir. 1998) (Browning, J.,
dissenting)).
50. I.N.S. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (construing a deportation statute); see
also id. at 1289 (quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir.
2004)).
51. Compare Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391, and Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500,
507 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to toll the voluntary departure period), with Azarte, 394 F.3d
at 1289, Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005), Sidikhouya v. Gonzales,
407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005), and Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1331
(11th Cir. 2006) (permitting the tolling of the voluntary departure period).
52. Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 2006) (Smith, J., dissenting)
(quoting Renteria-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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pending results from an administrative delay on the part of the BIA and
not any fault on the part of the alien. It was inequitable for the Fifth
Circuit to deny even one alien's opportunity to a home, a family, and a
life in the United States on account of such a technicality.
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